Introduction
Repeated Bayesian games, also known as repeated games of adverse selection, provide a model of long-run relationships where the parties have asymmetric information about their objectives.
1 It is well known that if each player's payoffrelevant private information, or type, is independently and identically distributed (iid) over time, repeated play can facilitate cooperation beyond what is achievable in a one-shot interaction. 2 In particular, the folk theorem of Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin (1994) implies that first-best efficiency can be approximately achieved as the discount factor tends to one. However, the iid assumption on types appears restrictive in many applications. For example, firms in an oligopoly or bidders in a series of procurement auctions may have private information about production costs, which tend to be autocorrelated. Furthermore, under the iid assumption, there is asymmetric information only about current payoffs. In contrasts, when types are serially dependent, the players also have private information about the distribution of future payoffs. This Date: January 11, 2013. We thank Manuel Amador, Kyle Bagwell, Aaron Bodoh-Creed, Matt Elliot, Johannes Hörner, Matt Jackson, Carlos Lever, Jon Levin, Romans Pancs, Andy Skrzypacz, and especially Ilya Segal for useful discussions. We are grateful to the editor and four anonymous referees for comments. Escobar acknowledges the support of Fondecyt Project 11090166 and the Millennium Institute on Complex Engineering Systems. Toikka acknowledges financial support from the Yrjö Jahnsson Foundation. An earlier version of this work was circulated as "A Folk Theorem with Markovian Private Information." Contact: jescobar@dii.uchile.cl or toikka@mit.edu. 1 For economic applications, see, e.g., Athey, Bagwell, and Sanchirico (2004) on oligopolistic competition, Levin (2003) on relational contracting, Maggi and Morelli (2006) on voting in international organizations, or Skrzypacz and Hopenhayn (2004) on repeated auctions. 2 See, e.g., Mailath and Samuelson (2006, Chapter 11) introduces the possibility of signaling, which presents a new challenge for cooperation as a player may be tempted to alter his behavior to influence the other players' beliefs about his type.
In this paper, we study the problem of sustaining cooperation among patient players in repeated Bayesian games with serially dependent types. More specifically, we assume that the type profile follows an autonomous irreducible Markov chain where the evolution of types is independent across players. Focusing on the case of private values (also known as the known-own-payoffs case) and observable actions, we define the stationary minmax value as the lowest payoff that can be imposed on a patient player by having the other players play a constant pureaction profile. Our main result then shows that with cheap-talk communication, generically, any payoff profile v, which lies in (an appropriately defined convex superset of) the Pareto frontier and dominates the stationary minmax profile, can be approximately attained in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium if the players are sufficiently patient. Furthermore, the equilibrium can be taken to be stationary in the sense of the players' expected continuation payoffs remaining close to v along the equilibrium path.
The key step in our proof of this limit-efficiency result is the derivation of an analogous result for auxiliary reporting games where players communicate as in the original game, but actions are selected by a mechanism. We introduce the credible reporting mechanism for which payoffs can be bounded uniformly across equilibria. This allows us to assert the existence of equilibria with the desired payoffs without solving the players' best-response problems or tracking beliefs.
3 The rest of the proof then extends a reporting-game equilibrium into an equilibrium of the original game by establishing the existence of player-specific punishments analogous to the stick-and-carrot schemes of Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) . Our credible reporting mechanism is of independent interest in that it gives an approximately efficient dynamic mechanism for patient players without assuming transferable utility. 4 It uses a statistical test to assess whether the players' reports about their types are sufficiently likely to have resulted from truthful reporting.
(If a player fails the test, his reports are henceforth replaced with appropriately chosen random messages.) The construction is inspired by the linking mechanism of Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) , who use message budgets to force the long-run distribution of each player's reports to match his true type distribution.
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3 While our proof is virtually free of beliefs, the equilibria we identify are in general not "belief free" or "ex post" in the sense of Lovo (2009), Hörner, Lovo, and Tomala (2011) , or Fudenberg and Yamamoto (2011b) . 4 When utility is transferable, surplus-maximizing decision rules can be implemented using a dynamic VCG scheme-see Athey and Segal (2007) and Bergemann and Välimäki (2010) . 5 In the single-agent version the idea goes back at least to Radner (1981) and Townsend (1982) .
It is used in the context of a repeated Bayesian game with iid types by Hörner and Jamison (2007) . Independently of our work, Renault, Solan, and Vieille (2011) use the linking mechanism
With iid types, their mechanism approximately implements efficient choice rules given a long enough horizon and sufficient patience. However, with Markov types, a player may be able to use his opponents' past reports to predict their future types. This gives rise to contingent deviations, which may undermine the linking mechanism. Our mechanism rules out such deviations by testing for the convergence of appropriately chosen conditional distributions. Games with Markovian types were introduced in the reputation literature under the assumption that the player is replaced upon type change (see, e.g., Cole, Dow, and English, 1995 , Mailath and Samuelson, 2001 , or Phelan, 2006 . Few papers consider Markovian types without replacements. The first results are due to Athey and Bagwell (2008) who analyze collusion in a Bertrand oligopoly with privatelyknown costs. They provide an example of a symmetric duopoly with irreducible binary costs where first-best collusion can be exactly achieved given sufficiently little discounting. Athey and Segal (2007) prove an efficiency result for a class of ergodic Markov games with transfers by showing that their Balanced Team Mechanism can be made self-enforcing if the players are sufficiently patient and there exists a "static" punishment equilibrium.
For the special case of iid types equilibrium payoffs can be characterized for a fixed discount factor using the methods of Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990) .
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A version of the folk theorem and a characterization of the limit equilibrium payoff set is provided by Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin (1994) and . At the other extreme, the results of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) imply that in the limiting case of perfectly persistent types there are games where equilibrium payoffs are bounded away from the first best even when players are arbitrarily patient.
7 Together with our results this shows that the set of equilibrium payoffs may be discontinuous in the joint limit when the discount factor tends to one and the chain becomes perfectly persistent. Finally, our game can be viewed as a stochastic game with asymmetric information about the state. Dutta (1995) , Fudenberg and Yamamoto (2011a) , and Hörner, Sugaya, Takahashi, and Vieille (2011) prove increasingly general versions of the folk theorem for stochastic games with a public irreducible state.
to characterize the limit set of equilibrium payoffs in sender-receiver games where the sender's type follows an ergodic Markov chain. The linking mechanism suffices in their case despite serial dependence because private information is one-sided. Our results are not stronger nor weaker than theirs since we assume private values whereas their game has interdependent values. 6 Cole and Kocherlakota (2001) extend the approach to a class of games that includes ours (see also Athey and Bagwell, 2008) . They operate on pairs of type-dependent payoff profiles and beliefs. Due to the inclusion of beliefs the characterization is difficult to put to work. 7 Starting with the work of Aumann and Maschler (1995) on zero-sum games, there is a sizable literature on perfectly persistent types (e.g., Athey and Bagwell, 2008 , Fudenberg and Yamamoto, 2011b , Hörner and Lovo, 2009 , Peski, 2008 , or Watson, 2002 . Such models are also used in the reputation literature (e.g., Kreps and Wilson, 1982 and Milgrom and Roberts, 1982) .
The next section illustrates our argument in the context of a simple Bertrand game. Section 3 introduces the model. The main result is presented in Section 4. The proof is developed in Sections 5 and 6 with 5 devoted to the mechanism design problem and 6 to the construction of equilibria. Section 7 concludes.
An Example
Consider repeated price competition between two firms, 1 and 2, whose privately known marginal costs are θ 1 ∈ {L, H} and θ 2 ∈ {M, V }, respectively, with L < M < H < V (for "low, medium, high, and very high"). Firm i's (i = 1, 2) cost follows a Markov chain in which with probability p ∈]0, 1[ the cost in period t + 1 is the same as in period t. The processes are independent across firms. In each period there is one buyer with unit demand and reservation value r > V . Having privately observed their current costs, the firms send reports to each other, quote prices, and the one with the lower price serves the buyer, provided its price does not exceed the buyer's reservation value.
This duopoly is a special case of the game introduced in Section 3, and thus our efficiency result (Theorem 4.1 and Corollary 4.1) applies. To illustrate the proof, we sketch the argument showing that, given sufficiently little discounting, there are equilibria with profits arbitrarily close to the first-best collusive scheme where in each period the firm with the lowest cost makes a sale at the monopoly price r.
2.1.
A Mechanism Design Problem. Assume first that the horizon T is large but finite, and firms do not discount profits. Assume further that the firms only send cost reports and some mechanism automatically sets the price r for the firm that reported the lowest cost and r + 1 for the other firm.
If both firms report their costs truthfully, then, for T large, firm 2 makes a sale in approximately for firm 2. Note that if firm i is truthful and firm j = i reports as if it were truthful, then firm i's profit is still approximately v i because the true cost of firm j does not directly enter i's payoff (i.e., we have private values). With this motivation, consider a mechanism which tests in real time whether the firms are sufficiently likely to have been truthful. If a firm fails the test, then from the next period onwards its messages are replaced with random messages generated by simulating the firm's cost process. In particular, suppose that (with high probability):
(1) A truthful firm passes the test regardless of the other firm's strategy.
(2) The distribution of (simulated) reports faced by a truthful firm is the same as under mutual truth-telling regardless of the other firm's strategy.
Then each firm i can secure an expected profit close to v i , say v i − ε, simply by reporting truthfully, and hence in any equilibrium its expected profit is at least
.5p H .5p .5(1 − p) Figure 1 . Distribution of reports when firm 1 reports truthfully and firm 2 reports M iff firm 1 reported H in the previous period.
As the profile v = (v 1 , v 2 ) is Pareto efficient, this implies that the set of expected equilibrium profits in the mechanism is concentrated near v. This observation is established for the general model in Theorem 5.1 by considering credible reporting mechanisms, which satisfy appropriate formalizations of (1) and (2). To motivate the construction, it is instructive to start with iid costs. Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) show that when costs are iid (i.e., p = 1 2 ), a mechanism that satisfies (1) and (2) can be obtained by assigning to each firm a budget of reports with T 2 reports of each type. This linking mechanism approximately satisfies (1) for T large enough by the law of large numbers. As for (2), it is useful to decompose the condition into the following requirements:
(2a) The marginal distribution of each firm's reports matches the truth. (2b) The distribution faced by a truthful firm is the product of the marginals.
Then (2a) follows by construction of the budgets. For (2b), suppose that, say, firm 1 reports truthfully. Then its reports are a sequence of iid draws, generated independently of firm 2's costs. Therefore, it is impossible for firm 2 to systematically correlate its reports with those of firm 1. This establishes (2b).
When costs are autocorrelated (i.e., p = 1 2 ), the budgets in the linking mechanism still give (1) and (2a). However, (2b) fails as a firm can use its competitor's past reports to predict its current report. For example, suppose firm 1 reports truthfully but firm 2 deviates and reports M if and only if firm 1 reported H in the previous period. This leads to the distribution depicted in Figure 1 , whereas under mutual truth-telling each report profile has probability 1 4 for all p.
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In order to rule out the above problem, we require each firm's conditional reporting frequencies to mirror the true conditional probabilities of the cost process. (Note that simply augmenting the linking mechanism by testing for independence of reports across firms yields a mechanism that fails property (1).) In particular, our credible reporting mechanism tests, for every fixed profile of previous period reports (θ 1 , θ 2 ) and a current report θ j for firm j, whether the reports of firm i = j are sufficiently likely to have resulted from truthful reporting. For example, along the random subsequence of periods in which firm 1 reported H and the previousperiod reports were (H, V ), under the null hypothesis of truth-telling, firm 2's 8 Note that the deviation leads to firm 2 making the sale in approximately p . Thus the deviation is profitable for p large enough, and hence approximate truth-telling is in general not an equilibrium of the linking mechanism for p = reports are iid with the probability of L being 1 − p. Thus the test requires that along the subsequence, firm 2 reports L with a frequency converging to 1 − p at a pre-specified rate. This rules out the deviation contemplated above.
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Lemma 5.1 shows that the credible reporting mechanism indeed satisfies (1) and (2). The proof takes some work because of the need to consider arbitrary strategies for non-truthful players, but the result is conceptually straightforward: (2) follows as a firm either passes the test and hence satisfies (2), or fails the test and has its reports replaced by simulated reports which satisfy (2) by construction. As for (1), note that firm i passes the test if the marginal distribution of its reported cost transitions converges to the truth, and these transitions appear sufficiently independent of those of firm j = i. If i is truthful, then the first part is immediate, and the second follows as the test conditions on a previous-period report profile so that, by the Strong Markov property, the argument reduces to the iid case.
2.2.
From the Mechanism to Game Equilibria. In order to construct equilibria of the original pricing game, we need to introduce discounting, extend the result to an infinite horizon, and make the mechanism self-enforcing.
Discounting can be introduced simply by continuity since the mechanism design problem has a finite horizon.
We cover the infinite horizon by having the firms repeatedly play the credible reporting mechanism over T -period blocks. This serves to guarantee that continuation profits are close to the target at all histories. It is worth noting that because of autocorrelation in costs, it is not possible to treat adjacent blocks independently of each other. However, the lower bound on profits from truthful reporting applies to each block and provides a bound on the continuation profits in all equilibria of the block mechanism (Corollary 5.1).
Finally, an equilibrium of the block mechanism is extended to an equilibrium of the original game by constructing off-path punishments that take the form of stickand-carrot schemes. For example, if firm 1 deviates by quoting a price different from what the mechanism would have chosen, then firm 2 prices at L during the stick while firm 1 best responds. The carrot is analogous to the cooperative phase, but has firm 2 selling-still at the monopoly price-more frequently than on the equilibrium path to reward it for the losses incurred during the stick.
9 With two players, it actually suffices to condition only on the previous-period report profile.
However, conditioning on the other players' contemporaneous reports is needed in general: Suppose there are three firms with costs drawn iid from {H, L} with both realizations equally likely. Suppose firms 1 and 2 report H in periods 2t − 1 and 2t for t odd, and they report L for t even. Then their joint reports form the sequence
If firm 3 reports truthfully, then conditional on any previous-period reports (θ1, θ2, θ3), each player reports H with the correct frequency of .5, but the joint distribution fails to converge to the truth. (An analogous problem arises in a static model-see Jackson and Sonnenschein, 2007) .
Formally, the punishment equilibria are obtained by bounding payoffs uniformly across the equilibria of a punishment mechanism which appends a minmax phase to the beginning of the credible reporting mechanism (Lemma 6.1). Checking incentives is then analogous to Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) (see Section 6.2).
3. The Model 3.1. The Stage Game. The stage game is a finite game of incomplete information
The interpretation is that each player i = 1, . . . , n has a privately known type θ i ∈ Θ i and chooses an action a i ∈ A i . As usual, u is extended to ∆(A × Θ) by expected utility.
10 In the proofs we assume without loss that
The players are assumed to know their own payoffs, stated formally as follows.
Assumption 3.1 (Private Values). For all a ∈ A, θ ∈ Θ, θ ∈ Θ, and i = 1, . . . , n,
Given the assumption, we write u i (a, θ i ) for u i (a, θ). 
The stage game u is played with actions a t i ∈ A i perfectly monitored. The public randomizations are iid draws from the uniform distribution on [0, 1] and independent of the players' types.
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Player i's type θ t i evolves according to an autonomous Markov chain (λ i , P i ) on Θ i , where λ i is the initial distribution and P i is the transition matrix. We make two assumptions about the players' type processes. 10 For any finite set X, we write ∆(X) for the set of all probability measures on X. 11 Since we allow for communication, there is a sense in which public randomizations are redundant: If the set of possible messages is large enough, the players can conduct jointly-controlled lotteries to generate such randomizations endogenously (see Aumann and Maschler, 1995) . 12 Independence of transitions is crucial for the argument. However, independence of initial distributions is only for convenience. Together they imply that the equilibrium beliefs are public, which simplifies the description of the equilibrium. All results hold verbatim for an arbitrary λ.
Let (λ, P ) denote the joint type process on Θ.
Assumption 3.3 (Irreducible Types). P is irreducible.
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Irreducibility of P implies that the dynamic game is stationary, or repetitive, and there exists a unique invariant distribution denoted π. Independence across players implies that the invariant distribution takes the form π = π 1 × · · · × π n , where π i is the invariant distribution for P i .
Given stage-game payoffs (v t i ) ∞ t=1 , player i's dynamic game payoff is
where the discount factor δ ∈ [0, 1[ is common for all players.
3.3. Histories, Assessments, and Equilibria. A public history consists of past messages, realizations of the randomization device, and actions. The set of all public histories in period t ≥ 1 is
The first set in the union consists of all public histories the players may face at stage t.2 when they are about to send messages; the second consists of all feasible public histories at t.4 when the players are about to choose actions. Let H = ∪ t≥1 H t . A private history of player i in period t consists of the sequence of types the player has observed up to and including period t. The set of all such histories is denoted
and the type process (λ, P ) induce a probability distribution over histories in the obvious way.
As types are independent across players and actions are observable, we assume that the players beliefs about private histories satisfy the standard restrictions imposed by perfect Bayesian equilibrium in multi-stage games with observable actions and incomplete information: (i) players −i have common beliefs about player i, (ii) types are believed to be independent across players, and (iii) "players cannot signal what they don't know" (see Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991) .
Formally, public histories h t andĥ t in H are i-indistinguishable if either
The common (public) beliefs about player i are given by a sequence
is called a belief system. Given a belief system µ, player j's belief about the private histories of players −j at a public history h t is the product measure i =j µ t i (h t ) ∈ i =j ∆(H t i ). An assessment is a pair (σ, µ) where σ is a strategy profile and µ is a belief system. Given an assessment (σ, µ), let u µ i (σ | h t , h t i ) denote player i's expected continuation payoff at history (h t , h t i ), i.e., the expected discounted average payoff of player i from history (h t , h t i ) onwards (period t inclusive) when the expectation over i's rivals' private histories is taken according to µ and play evolves according to σ. An assessment (σ, µ) is sequentially rational if for any player i, any history (h t , h t i ) and any strategy σ i , u
). An assessment (σ, µ) is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (or a PBE for short) if it is sequentially rational and µ is computed using Bayes rule given σ wherever possible (both on and off the path of play).
3.4. Feasible Payoffs. Write (f t ) t≥1 for a sequence of decision rules f t : Θ t × [0, 1] t → A mapping histories of types and public randomizations into actions. The set of feasible payoffs in the dynamic game with discount factor δ is then
(Unless otherwise noted, all expectations are with respect to the joint distribution of the type process (λ, P ) and the public randomizations.) Consider the set of payoffs attainable using a pure decision rule in a one-shot interaction in which types are drawn from the invariant distribution π, or
Lemma 3.1 (Dutta, 1995) .
Heuristically, the result follows from noting that in a stationary environment, (randomized) stationary decision rules are enough to generate all feasible payoffs, and for δ close to 1 the expected payoff from such a rule depends essentially only on the invariant distribution.
In what follows we focus on the limit feasible set V , keeping in mind that it is an arbitrarily good approximation to V (δ) when players are patient.
3.5. Minmax Values. Define player i's stationary (pure-action) minmax value as v i = min
and let v = (v 1 , . . . , v n ). This can be interpreted as the pure-action minmax value in a one-shot game where types are distributed according to the invariant distribution π. Thus in the special case of iid types, v i is simply the standard pure-action minmax value. Since this is a novel concept and responsible for a limitation of our results, some remarks are in order.
Our motivation for the definition is pragmatic: v i is approximately the lowest payoff that can be imposed on a patient player i by having players −i play a fixed pure-action profile for a large number of periods while player i best responds knowing his current type. This facilitates constructing stick-and-carrot punishments that generate payoffs close to v i during the stick phase. For example, in the Bertrand game studied by Athey and Bagwell (2008) (and considered in Section 2) this actually yields a tight lower bound on the set of individually-rational payoffs:
Example 3.1 (Bertrand competition/First-price auction). Each player i is a firm setting a price a i ∈ A i ⊂ R + . There is a buyer who demands one unit of the good each period, has a reservation value r ∈]0, 1[, and buys from the firm with the lowest price (randomizing uniformly in case of ties). Assume {0, r, 1} ⊂ A i for all i. Firm i's privately-known marginal cost is θ i ∈ Θ i ⊂ R + , and thus its profit is u i (a, θ i ) = (a i − θ i )1 {a i =min{a 1 ,...,an,r}} 1 |{k|a k =min j a j }| . Then v i = 0, since the profit is nonpositive at a −i = 0, whereas firm i can guarantee a zero profit with a i = 1.
In general there may be equilibria generating payoffs strictly below v i .
14 In particular, the stationary minmax value entails two possible limitations: First, defining v i using pure actions is obviously restrictive in general even with iid types. Indeed, as complete information games are a special case of our model, we may take u to be the standard matching pennies game to see that in the worst case we may even have v i = max a,θ i u i (a, θ i ) with the vector v lying above the feasible set V . We have nothing to add to this well-known observation.
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The proper minmax value for our dynamic game is given by a problem of the form
which can be interpreted as the value of a discounted zero-sum game with Markovian private information on one side (see Renault (2006) or Neyman (2008) for the undiscounted case). This definition is difficult to put to work as little is known about the optimal strategy of the uninformed player (here, players −i) when the type is irreducible. However, Hörner and Lovo (2009) show that it can be used in games with perfectly persistent types as the strategy of the uninformed player is then given by the approachability result of Blackwell (1956) . 15 Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) proved a mixed minmax folk theorem for complete information games by adjusting continuation payoffs in the carrot phase to make the punishers indifferent over all actions in the support of a mixed minmax profile. Extending the argument to our setting Figure 2 . The payoff of player 1 for θ 1 ∈ {0, 1} in Example 3.2.
Second, and more pertinent to the current setting, players −i should in general tailor the punishment to the information they learn about player i's type during the punishment. This is illustrated by the next example. 
Heuristically, the reason is that player 1's myopic best response reveals his type. This is harmless in the iid case, but allows player 2 to tailor the punishment when types are correlated.
The above limitations notwithstanding, there is an important class of dynamic games in which v i is in fact a tight lower bound on player i's individually rational payoffs. These are games where the stage game u is such that for every player i and all θ i ∈ Θ i , the mixed minmax value min
is achieved in pure strategies, and
Then the intersection on the right contains a pure action profile a −i ∈ A −i such that for all types of player i, a −i is the harshest possible punishment. While this property is arguably special, it is true for many familiar games including the Bertrand game of Example 3.1 and all of the examples introduced in the next section.
3.6. Examples. The following examples illustrate the model and some of the definitions already introduced. They also provide instances of economic applications to which our main results (Theorem 4.1 and Corollary 4.1) apply.
is not straightforward as the variation in payoffs during the stick phase is private information and our methods characterize continuation values only "up to an ε." Alternatively, Gossner (1995) uses a statistical test to asses whether the players are mixing with the right distributions. Extending his approach seems promising, but beyond the scope of this paper.
Figure 3. The payoff function for the public good game of Example 3.4.
Example 3.3 (Cournot competition). Each player i is a firm that chooses a quantity a i ∈ A i ⊂ R + , where 0 ∈ A i . The market price is given by the positive and decreasing inverse demand p( i a i ). Firm i's cost function takes the form
Assuming that for all i there existsā −i ∈ A −i such that p( j =iā j ) = 0, we deduce that v i = 0 for all i since i's rivals can flood the market by setting a −i =ā −i , whereas firm i can guarantee a zero profit by setting a i = 0.
Example 3.4 (Public good provision/Partnership). In the binary-contribution game of Palfrey and Rosenthal (1988) (see also Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991) , each of two players chooses whether to contribute (C) or not (D) to a joint project. Player i's cost of contributing is θ i ∈ Θ i ⊂ R + . The project yields a benefit 1 or β ≥ 1 depending on whether one or two players contributed. The payoff function is depicted in Figure 3 .
Note that the best response of player i depends on his type.
Example 3.5 (Informal risk sharing). Consider an n-player version of the insurance problem of Wang (1995) , which is an incomplete-information variant of the model by Kocherlakota (1996) . Each player i is an agent with a random
, whereū i is nondecreasing and concave.
, since agents −i can opt to make no transfers to agent i, whereas agent i can guarantee this autarky payoff by consuming his endowment.
The Main Result
Let P(V ) denote the (strong) Pareto frontier of the limit feasible set V , and let V c denote the set of payoffs from constant decision rules, i.e.,
In this game the set of feasible actions Ai(θi) depends on the realized type θi. However, by letting Ai = ∪ θ i ∈Θ i Ai(θi) and defining ui(a, θi) to be some very large negative number if ai / ∈ Ai(θi), we recover an essentially equivalent game where Ai is independent of θi. The shaded area is W * , which is contained in the set of limit PBE payoffs. w 1 and w 2 are used to construct player-specific punishments for v.
which consists of all vectors in W that are strictly above the stationary minmax profile v. See Figure 4 for a schematic illustration for n = 2. Note that while we are mainly interested in the Pareto frontier P(V ), including the set V c in the definition of W expands the set from which punishment profiles can be chosen.
The following is our main result.
Theorem 4.1. Let v ∈ W * allow player-specific punishments in W * . Then, for all ε > 0, there existsδ < 1 such that for all δ >δ, there exists a perfect Bayesian equilibrium where the expected continuation payoffs are within distance ε of v at all on-path histories.
Theorem 4.1 shows that player-specific punishments are sufficient for a payoff vector v, which is a convex combination of payoffs to Pareto-efficient and constant decision rules and strictly dominates the stationary minmax value v, to be virtually attainable in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium when players are patient. Furthermore, the equilibrium can be taken to be stationary in the sense of continuation payoffs remaining close to v at all on-path histories.
The statement of Theorem 4.1 leaves open the question about the nonemptiness of the set W * and the existence of player-specific punishments. To address these, say that v ∈ R n is a limit equilibrium payoff if it satisfies the conclusion of Theorem 4.1. Observe that every v in the interior of W * allows player-specific punishments in W * and hence is a limit equilibrium payoff (cf. Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986) . The following limit-efficiency result then obtains by noting that W * has nonempty interior if and only if W is full-dimensional and there exists v ∈ V such that v > v.
Corollary 4.1. If W is full-dimensional, then every v ∈ P(V ) such that v > v is a limit equilibrium payoff. If n = 2, then the full-dimensionality of W can be dispensed with.
See Appendix A for the proof of the two-player result. More generally, if W is full-dimensional, then every v ∈ W * is a limit equilibrium payoff.
17 It is thus worth noting that the full-dimensionality of W can be naturally viewed as a generic property: Given the type process (λ, P ), it holds for an open set of full Lebesgue measure in the space of stage games with private values (i.e., in R |A| i |Θ i | ) provided that each player has at least two actions. 18 However, there still remains the possibility that W * may be empty, since-as discussed in Section 3.5-the stationary minmax value may lie outside the feasible set V . While this is a robust problem in general, it does not appear to be particularly limiting for economic applications. For instance, W * is nonempty and full-dimensional in all of the examples of Sections 3.5 and 3.6 (save for Example 3.2 where player 2's payoffs were left unspecified).
Credible Reporting Mechanisms
In this section we consider auxiliary games where there is a mechanism which automatically selects a history-dependent action profile in each period so that the game reduces to one where the players just send messages.
A (direct) T -period mechanism, T ∈ N ∪ {∞}, is a collection (f t ) T t=1 of decision rules f t : Θ t ×[0, 1] t → A mapping histories of messages and public randomizations into action profiles. Each mechanism induces a T -period reporting game that is obtained from the dynamic game defined in Subsection 3.2 by replacing stage t.4 with t.4 The mechanism selects the action profile f t (m 1 , ω 1 , . . . , m t , ω t ) ∈ A, 17 In fact, it suffices that the players' expected utilities from efficient or constant decision rules satisfy the non-equivalent-utilities condition of Abreu, Dutta, and Smith (1994) . 18 To see this, note that co(V c ) (and hence
, with a ∈ A, the system a∈A βav(a) = 0 only has the trivial solution β ≡ 0. Since πi ∈ R n is a probability measure for all i, the Transversality theorem can be used to show that this holds for all (ui(a, θi) and truncating the game after period T . A strategy ρ i for player i is simply the restriction of some dynamic game strategy σ i to the appropriate histories. Write ρ * i for the truthful strategy. 19 We abuse terminology by using 'mechanism' to refer both to a collection (f t ) T t=1 as well as to the game it induces. In what follows we introduce the (class of) credible reporting mechanism(s), or CRM for short. A CRM tests in every period whether each player's past messages are sufficiently likely to have resulted from truthful reporting. If a player fails the test, then the mechanism ignores his messages from the next period onwards and substitutes appropriately generated random messages for them. The CRM maps current messages to actions according to some stationary decision rule.
Formally, given a sequence (x 1 , . . . , x t ) ∈ Θ t , t ≥ 1, let
for (θ, θ ) ∈ Θ × Θ and i = 1, . . . , n. Define the empirical frequency
,
, a null sequence). We say that player i passes the test
That is, i passes the test if and only if, for all (θ, θ −i ), the distribution of x s i over periods s such that (
20 Note that if the sequence (x 1 , . . . , x t ) is generated by the true type process (λ, P ), then player i's types over the said periods are in fact iid draws from P i (· | θ i ) by the Strong Markov property and Assumption 3.2. Since the left-hand side of (5.1) is the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic for testing the hypothesis that the sample P t i (· | θ, θ −i ) is generated by independent draws from P i (· | θ i ), this implies that a test (b k ) can be chosen such that under the true process (λ, P ) player i passes with probability arbitrarily close to 1 even as t → ∞.
19 I.e., ρ * t
Our test is related to, but different from, standard statistical methods in Markov chains (see, e.g., Amemiya, 1985, Chapter 11) . Indeed, the transition count is the maximum likelihood estimator for a first-order Markov model. But our objective is unconventional as we want i to pass the test given arbitrary strategies (and hence arbitrary processes) for −i as long as i's transitions converge to the truth and appear sufficiently independent from those of −i.
A CRM is a triple (f, (b k ), T ), where f : Θ → A is a decision rule, (b k ) is a test, and T < ∞ denotes the time horizon. Let ξ : Θ × [0, 1] → Θ be a function such that if ω is drawn from the uniform distribution on [0, 1], then for all θ ∈ Θ, ξ(θ, ω) is distributed on Θ according to P (· | θ). The CRM (f, (b k ), T ) selects actions according to the following recursion:
For all 1 ≤ t ≤ T and every player i, put
and let a t = f (x t ).
Remark 5.1. We note for future reference that the above recursion implicitly defines functions χ = (χ t ) T t=1 , χ t : Θ t × [0, 1] t → Θ, such that for all i and t,
A CRM is thus a mechanism (f t ) T t=1 where
The next lemma shows that there exists a test lenient enough for a truthful player to be likely to pass it, yet stringent enough so that the empirical distribution of (x 1 , . . . , x T ) converges to the invariant distribution π of the true type process as T → ∞ regardless of the players' strategies.
Lemma 5.1. Let ε > 0. There exists a test (b k ) satisfying the following conditions:
(1) In every CRM (f, (b k ), T ), for all i, all ρ −i , and all λ,
(2) ∃T < ∞ such that in every CRM (f, (b k ), T ) with T >T , for all ρ and all λ, the empirical distribution of (x 1 , . . . , x T ), denoted π T , satisfies
When all players are truthful (i.e., if ρ = ρ * ), the existence of the test can be shown by using the convergence properties of Markov chains. The lemma extends the result uniformly to arbitrary strategies. The proof, presented in Appendix B, relies on the independence of transitions and our formulation of the test. In particular, for player i to pass the test requires that (i) the marginal distribution of his (reported) type transitions converges to the truth, and (ii) these transitions appear sufficiently independent of the other players' transitions (as the test is done separately for each (θ, θ −i )). If player i reports truthfully, (i) is immediate and (ii) follows since, by independence, it is impossible for players −i to systematically correlate their transitions with those of player i when the test conditions on the previous period type profile. This explains the first part of the lemma.
For the second part, suppose player i plays any strategy ρ i . Then either he passes the test in all periods, in which case (i) and (ii) follow by definition of the test, or he fails in some period t, after which the CRM generates x s i , s > t, by simulating the true type process for which (i) and (ii) follow by the argument in the first part of the lemma. An accounting argument then establishes the convergence of the long-run distribution of (x 1 , . . . , x T ).
We say that player i can truthfully securev i in the CRM (f, (
where the expectation is with respect to the distribution induced by the strategy profile (ρ * i , ρ −i ). That is, truthful reporting secures expected payoffv i to player i if, regardless of the reporting strategies of the other players, player i's expected payoff from truthful reporting is at leastv i .
For every v ∈ V p , take
Our interest in the CRMs stems from the following security-payoff property:
Theorem 5.1. Let ε > 0. There exist a test (b k ) and a timeT such that for all T >T , there exists a discount factorδ < 1 such that for all v ∈ V p , all δ >δ, and all λ, every player i can truthfully secure
Since we have private values (Assumption 3.1), player i's payoff depends only on the joint distribution of his own true types (θ 1 i , . . . , θ T i ) and the "edited reports" (x 1 , . . . , x T ). Thus the result follows essentially immediately from Lemma 5.1. See Appendix B for the details. We now extend CRMs to an infinite horizon by constructing "block mechanisms" in which the players repeatedly play randomly chosen T -period CRMs. Let (φ, (b k , ), T ) denote a random CRM, i.e., a CRM where the decision rule f is determined once and for all by an initial public randomization φ ∈ ∆(A Θ ). For concreteness, we use the period-1 public randomization so that, with slight abuse of notation, f = φ(·, ω 1 ) for some φ : Θ × [0, 1] → A.
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A block CRM (φ, (b k ), T ) ∞ is an infinite-horizon mechanism where the random CRM (φ, (b k ), T ) is applied to each T -period block (k − 1)T + 1, . . . , kT , k ∈ N.
21 It is clear from the proof that the players not knowing which decision rule will be chosen before sending their period-1 messages does not effect the security-payoff result of Theorem 5.1.
Note that, by construction, the action profile selected by the mechanism depends only on the messages and public randomizations in the current block.
A result of Fudenberg and Levine (1983, Theorem 6 .1) implies that a perfect Bayesian equilibrium exists in a block CRM.
22 Together with the following corollary to Theorem 5.1 this shows that every payoff profile v which is a convex combination of payoffs to Pareto-efficient or constant decision rules can be approximated by a block CRM where in every perfect Bayesian equilibrium, the continuation-payoff profile is close to v at all histories.
Corollary 5.1. Let ε > 0. There exist a test (b k ), a time T , and a discount factor δ < 1 such that for all v ∈ W , all δ >δ, and all λ, the expected continuation payoffs are within distance ε of v at all histories in all perfect Bayesian equilibria of the
The idea for the proof, presented in Appendix B, can be sketched as follows. Note first that if we replace W with V c in the statement of the Corollary, then the claim is obvious since, by definition, any v ∈ V c can be generated with a constant decision rule under which actions are independent of the players' reports. On the other hand, if we replace W with P(V ), we can apply the security-payoff result of Theorem 5.1 to each block to bound equilibrium payoffs from below, and then use feasibility to bound them from above. In particular, a lower bound follows by observing that at any history each player can revert to truthful reporting for the rest of the game, which guarantees the security payoff from all future blocks. With sufficiently little discounting, this is essentially all that matters for continuation payoffs. We then obtain the result for the entire set W = co(P(V ) ∪ V c ) by randomizing over decision rules at the start of the block. While characterizing actual equilibrium behavior would be difficult, we note in passing that truthful reporting forms an ε-equilibrium.
Constructing Game Equilibria
In this section we finally construct game equilibria to deduce Theorem 4.1. To this end, let v ∈ W * allow player-specific punishments in W * . Without loss of generality, take ε > 0 small enough so that the collection of punishment profiles Fudenberg and Levine (1983) assume that all players including Nature have finitely many actions at each stage whereas we have a continuous public randomization in each period. However, the range of ξ is finite, and hence a finite randomization device suffices for any given CRM. Since block CRMs employ only finitely many CRMs, the same holds for them. An equilibrium of such a coarsened game remains an equilibrium in the game with a continuous randomization device. (These inequalities ensure that ε is small enough given the below choice of stickphase length L(δ), which needs to be varied with δ due to the "approximation error" ε in payoffs.) Corollary 5.1 yields block CRMs
T ) ∞ and a discount factor δ 0 < 1 such that for all δ > δ 0 , the expected continuation payoffs are within distance ε of the corresponding target payoffs v, w 1 , . . . , w n at all histories in all perfect Bayesian equilibria of the block CRMs. Along the equilibrium path the players are simply assumed to mimic an equilibrium of the block CRM (φ 0 , (b k ), T ). However, as the players are now able to choose actions, they have to be enforced by means of suitable punishments. The other block CRMs are used to establish the existence of such punishments as follows.
6.1. Player-Specific Punishments. For each player i take a minmaxing profile
Given L ∈ N and the block CRM (φ i , (b k ), T ) ∞ , we construct an auxiliary game (L, (φ i , (b k ), T ) ∞ ) that runs over t = 1, 2, . . . as follows. At each t ∈ {1, . . . , L}, the game proceeds exactly as the dynamic game defined in Section 3.2, except that every player j = i is forced to take the action a t j = a i j . At t = L + 1, the block CRM (φ i , (b k ), T ) ∞ starts and runs over all subsequent periods. (Note that the construction of the block mechanism starting at L + 1 does not depend on how play transpires during the first L periods.) The evolution of types in the game (L, (φ i , (b k ), T ) ∞ ) is identical to that in the dynamic game. However, it will be useful to have separate notation for the initial distribution of types, which will be denoted B ∈ ∆(Θ) with B(θ) = n i=1 B i (θ i ). We refer to the game (L, (φ i , (b k ), T ) ∞ ) defined above as the punishment mechanism against i. It starts with players j = i being restricted to minmax player i for L periods while player i can best respond with any actions a t i ∈ A i , t = 1, . . . , L. The block CRM (φ i , (b k ), T ) ∞ then ensues. For reasons that will become clear in the proof, we choose L as
Note that as δ → 1, we have L(δ) → ∞ and δ L(δ) → 1 − γ.
The following result provides bounds on the players' equilibrium payoffs in the punishment mechanism against i.
Lemma 6.1. There exists δ 1 ≥ δ 0 such that the following hold:
(1) For all i, all δ > δ 1 , all initial beliefs B, and all perfect Bayesian equilibria of the punishment mechanism (L(δ), (φ i , (b k ), T ) ∞ ), the expected continuation payoffs are within distance ε of w i at all period-t histories for t > L(δ). (2) For all i, all δ > δ 1 , and all θ i ∈ Θ i ,
The proof is presented in Appendix C. The first part follows immediately from Corollary 5.1, since in periods t > L(δ) the players are playing the block CRM (φ i , (b k ), T ) ∞ . To interpret the second part, observe that the left-hand side is an upper bound on player i's discounted average payoff from the periods in which he is being minmaxed (i.e., from the first
The existence of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in the punishment mechanisms follows by Fudenberg and Levine (1983, Theorem 6 .1).
Phases and Equilibrium
Strategies. An equilibrium yielding continuation payoffs within ε of v can now be informally described as follows (see Appendix D for a formal description of the equilibrium strategies and beliefs). The equilibrium starts in the cooperative phase where play mimics an equilibrium of the block CRM (φ 0 , (b k ), T ) ∞ . That is, the players send messages according to the equilibrium of the mechanism and play the action profile the mechanism would have chosen given the history of messages and public randomizations. As long as there has never been a period where some player deviated from the action prescribed by the mechanism, play remains in the cooperative phase. This is the case everywhere on the equilibrium path.
A deviation by player i from the prescribed action in the cooperative phase triggers the punishment phase against i where play mimics an equilibrium of the punishment mechanism (L, (φ i , (b k ), T ) ∞ ). This consists of the stick subphase-in which the deviator i is minmaxed for L periods-followed by the carrot subphase, which builds on the block CRM (φ i , (b k ), T ) ∞ . In the stick subphase, all players send messages and player i chooses actions as in the equilibrium of the punishment mechanism, and players −i play the minmax profile prescribed by the mechanism.
In the carrot subphase, the players continue to send messages according to the equilibrium, and all players play the action profile prescribed by the mechanism. As long as there has never been a period where a player deviated from the action prescribed by the punishment mechanism (either some player k = i during the stick, or any player during the carrot), play remains in the punishment phase against i. A deviation by player j from the prescribed action triggers the punishment phase against j.
Within each phase beliefs evolve as in the equilibrium being mimicked. If some player i triggers a change of phase by deviating from the action prescribed by the mechanism, then the initial beliefs for the punishment mechanism against i are determined by the current public beliefs about the players' types in the period where the deviation occurred.
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Remark 6.1. It is worth emphasizing that a change in phase is triggered only when a player deviates from the action prescribed by the mechanism. A player may also deviate from the equilibrium of the mechanism by sending a different message, and this deviation may be observable (e.g., suppose that the equilibrium of the mechanism has the player reporting truthfully, and type transitions do not have full support). Similarly, the punishment mechanism against i does not prescribe actions for player i when he is being minmaxed so that he may have an observable deviation there. However, both of these deviations result in a history which is feasible in the mechanism, and therefore the equilibrium that is being mimicked prescribes some continuation strategies and beliefs following the deviation. Accordingly, we assume that the players simply continue to mimic the equilibrium.
As the strategies described above have the players mimic an equilibrium of the block CRM (φ 0 , (b k ), T ) ∞ on the path of play, they result in continuation payoffs that are within distance ε of v after all on-path histories by Corollary 5.1. Thus to complete the proof of Theorem 4.1, it suffices to show that the strategies are sequentially rational. To this end, note that within each phase play corresponds to an equilibrium of some mechanism, and hence deviations that do not lead to a change of phase are unprofitable a priori. Therefore, it is enough to verify that at every history, no player gains by triggering a change of phase by deviating in action. 24 We do this by showing that there existsδ < 1 such that, regardless of the history, triggering a change of phase cannot be optimal for a player when δ >δ.
23 More precisely, if the punishment phase against i starts in period t, then the initial beliefs in the punishment mechanism against i are given by the current public beliefs over the entire private histories Θ t . However, the continuation equilibrium of the punishment mechanism depends only on the beliefs about the period-t type profile. 24 Note that such deviations include "double deviations," where a player first deviates within a phase, and only then deviates in a way that triggers the punishment.
Cooperative-phase histories: Suppose play is in the cooperative phase. Then player j's expected continuation payoff is at least v j − ε. A one-stage deviation in action triggers the punishment phase against j and, by Lemma 6.1, for δ ≥ δ 1 yields at most
At δ = 1, the right-hand side is strictly less than v j − ε. Therefore, we can find δ 2 ≥ δ 1 such that for all δ > δ 2 the deviation is unprofitable. Stick-subphase histories: Consider a history at which player i should be minmaxed. It is enough to show that, for j = i, it is in player j's interest to choose a i j (see Remark 6.1). By conforming, j's payoff is at least δ L(δ) (w i j − ε), whereas a one-stage deviation in action triggers the punishment phase against j. By Lemma 6.1, for δ ≥ δ 1 the incentive constraint takes the form
As δ → 1, the inequality becomes γ(v j + ε) + (1 − γ)(w j j − w i j + 2ε) ≤ 0, which holds strictly by (6.2). Thus, there exists δ 3 ≥ δ 2 such that for all δ > δ 3 , the deviation is unprofitable.
Carrot-subphase histories: Suppose play is in the carrot subphase of the punishment phase against i. Then player j's continuation payoff is at least w i j − ε. A one-stage deviation in action triggers the punishment phase against j and we use Lemma 6.1 to write the incentive constraint preventing the deviation for δ ≥ δ 1 as
It is enough to check this inequality when j = i since w i j > w j j for j = i. But by our choice of γ and ε, (6.1) holds for all j and hence the limit incentive constraint holds with strict inequality. We conclude that there exists δ 4 ≥ δ 3 such that for all δ > δ 4 , the deviation is unprofitable. Putδ = δ 4 . Then all one-stage deviations that trigger a change of phase are unprofitable for all δ >δ, and hence the strategies are sequentially rational. Theorem 4.1 follows.
Concluding Remarks
Our main result (Theorem 4.1) shows that repeated interaction may allow individuals to overcome the problems of self-interested behavior and asymmetric information even if private information is persistent. The proof suggests that, given enough patience, cooperation can be supported with behavior that amounts to a form of mental accounting: If the history of a player's reports about his private state appears credible when evaluated against the reports of the other, then that player's reports are taken at face value when deciding on actions. If a player loses credibility, which may happen with some probability, then his reports no longer matter for the choice of actions. However, as long as the player complies with the chosen actions, this is his only punishment, and he will regain credibility after a while. It is only in the event of a deviation in actions that a harsher punishment is used, but this is off the equilibrium path.
7.1. On the Limit Equilibrium Payoff Set. Let E(δ) ⊂ R n be the set of PBE payoffs in our dynamic Bayesian game. Theorem 4.1 provides an inner bound for the set E(δ) in the limit as δ → 1, but a sharper characterization of this set is an important open question. In some special cases, however, our results provide a tight estimate of E(δ) as players become arbitrarily patient.
Observe first that in the special case of a game of complete information, V = V c . Thus under the full-dimensionality assumption, we recover an approximate pureminmax version of the folk theorem by Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) .
More interestingly, in a Bertrand game with privately-known costs our inner bound is actually tight:
Proposition 7.1. Consider the Bertrand game of Example 3.1 and assume that
This result yields a folk theorem for dynamic Bayesian Bertrand games as feasibility and individual rationality imply E(δ) ⊂ V (δ) ∩ R n + for all δ. From Proposition 7.1 and Lemma 3.1 we then deduce that feasibility and individual rationality are the only restrictions that can be imposed on equilibrium payoffs as δ → 1. 7.2. Robustness. There are various directions in which the robustness of our results could be explored:
We assume that the type process is autonomous. Extending the results to decision-controlled processes studied in the literature on stochastic games (see, e.g., Dutta, 1995) appears feasible but notationally involved.
The main restrictions we impose on the players' information are private values (Assumption 3.1), independence across players (Assumption 3.2), and irreducibility (Assumption 3.3). As mentioned in the Introduction, when types are perfectly persistent, the limit equilibrium payoff set may be bounded away from efficiency. Similarly, with interdependent values, efficiency need not be achievable even with transfers (see Jehiel and Moldovanu, 2001) . Thus private values and irreducibility are necessary for general efficiency results. In contrast, correlation of types typically expands the set of implementable outcomes in a mechanism design setting (see Cremer and McLean, 1988 ). Therefore we conjecture that our results extend to correlated transitions even if our proof does not.
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Finally, the assumption about communication in every period cannot in general be dispensed with without affecting the set of achievable payoffs. To see this, it suffices to consider the Cournot game of Example 3.3 in the special case of iid types. The collusive scheme where the firm with the lowest cost always produces the monopoly output is infeasible without communication. In contrast, by Corollary 4.1 the resulting profits are limit equilibrium payoffs when cheap talk is allowed.
Appendix A. A Proof for Section 4
Proof of Corollary 4.1. If W is full-dimensional, the result follows by the argument given in the text. Thus it suffices to take n = 2 and 0 ≤ dim W ≤ 1 (since W = ∅).
Observe that if dim P(V ) = 1, then every v ∈ P(V ), v > v, allows player-specific punishments in W * (they can be chosen in P(V )). So it remains to consider the case where P(V ) is a singleton. Then there exists a decision rule f : Θ → A such that for all θ ∈ Θ and all i,
Consider the following pure strategy for player i. For all h t ∈ H t and h t i ∈ Θ t i , if h t = (m 1 , ω 1 , a 1 , . . . , m t−1 , ω t−1 , a t−1 ), then
At any public history, the belief µ i about player i puts probability 1 to the private history that coincides with the history of i's messages. To verify that strategies are sequentially rational, observe that for any t ≥ 1, continuation play from period t+1 onward does not depend on the outcome in period t. Thus, a player cannot gain by deviating in messages as truthful messages maximize his current payoff. Following (truthful or non-truthful) reports in period t, a player cannot gain by choosing a different action either as the equilibrium action maximizes his current payoff given his type. The corollary now follows by noting that the expected equilibrium payoff converges to the efficient profile E π [u(f (θ), θ)] as δ → 1 (uniformly in λ).
25 Our proof does extend to the case where the correlation is due to a public Markov state but transitions are independent conditional on the state.
Appendix B. Proofs for Section 5 B.1. Preliminaries. We state and prove two convergence results that are used in the proof of Lemma 5.1. The first is a corollary of Massart's (1990) result about the rate of convergenge in the Glivenko-Cantelli theorem. Throughout · denotes the sup-norm.
Lemma B.1. Let Θ be a finite set, and let g ∈ ∆(Θ). Given an infinite sequence of independent draws from g, let g k denote the empirical measure obtained by observing the first k draws. (I.e., for all k ∈ N and all θ ∈ Θ, g k (θ) =
Proof. Fix α > 0 and define the sequence (b k ) k∈N by
(In this proof only, π denotes the ratio of a circle's circumference to its diameter, not the invariant distribution.) Clearly b k → 0 so that (b k ) k∈N is a null sequence. Without loss, label the elements of Θ from 1 to |Θ|. Define the cdf G from g by setting G(l) = l j=1 g(j). The empirical cdf's G k are defined analogously from g k . For all k, all l,
where the second inequality is by Massart (1990) and the equality is by definition of b k . The lemma now follows by observing that
where the last equality follows since
Lemma B.2. Let P be an irreducible stochastic matrix on a finite set Θ, and let π denote the unique invariant distribution for P . Let (θ t ) t∈N be a sequence in Θ. For all t, define the empirical matrix P t by setting
and define the empirical distribution π t by setting
For all ε > 0 there exists T < ∞ and η > 0 such that for all t ≥ T ,
P t is an empirical transition matrix that records for each state θ the empirical conditional frequencies of transitions θ → θ in (θ s ) t s=1 . Similarly, π t is an empirical measure that records the frequencies of states in (θ s ) t s=1 . So the lemma states roughly that if the conditional transition frequencies converge to those in P , then the empirical distribution converges to the invariant distribution for P .
Proof. Fix θ ∈ Θ and t ∈ N. Note that tπ t θ is the number of visits to θ in (θ s ) t s=1 . Since each visit to θ is either in period 1 or preceded by some state θ, we have
On the other hand,
where the second inequality follows, since |{s < t : θ s = θ}| ≥ tπ t θ − 1 and θ P t (θ | θ) ≤ |Θ|. Putting together the above inequalities gives
Since θ was arbitrary, we have in vector notation
where I is the identity matrix and 1 denotes a |Θ|-vector of ones. This implies that for all t, there exists e t ∈ R |Θ| such that e t ≤ |Θ| t and π t (I − P t ) = e t . Let E be a |Θ| × |Θ|-matrix of ones. Then
It is straightforward to verify that the matrix I − P + E is invertible when P is irreducible (see, e.g., Norris, 1997, Exercise 1.7.5). The set of invertible matrices is open, so there exists η 1 > 0 such that I − P t + E is invertible if P t − P < η 1 . Furthermore, the mapping Q → (I − Q + E) −1 is continuous at P , so there exists
If t ≥ T and P t − P < η, then
The lemma follows.
B.2. Proof of Lemma 5.1. Fix ε > 0 once and for all. By Lemma B.1, there exists a test (b k ) such that for all probability measures g with finite support,
, where g k denotes the empirical measure of the first k observations of an infinite sequence of iid draws from g. Fix some such test (b k ). We claim that it satisfies conditions (1) and (2) of Lemma 5.1.
Consider first condition (1). Fix T , i, λ, and ρ −i . It is without loss to assume that λ is degenerate and ρ −i is a pure strategy profile as the general case then follows by taking expectations. Similarly, it obviously suffices to show the claim conditional on an arbitrary realization (θ t −i , ω t ) T t=1 . To this end, note that by Assumption 3.2, for any degenerate λ, the Markov chain (λ i , P i ) is a version of the conditional distribution of (θ t i ) T t=1 given (θ t −i , ω t ) T t=1 . Furthermore, for a fixed realization (θ t −i , ω t ) T t=1 , the vectors x t −i (t = 1, . . . , T ) are generated as deterministic functions of i's truthful messages according to some "pure strategy" r = (r t ) T t=1 , r t : Θ t−1 i → Θ −i , induced by ρ −i and χ, where χ is the mapping defined in Remark 5.1. Thus it suffices to establish the following:
Proof. We start by introducing a collection of auxiliary random variables, which are used to generate player i's types. (The construction that follows is inspired by Billingsley, 1961 .) Let ([0, 1], B,P) be a probability space. On this space define a countably infinite collection of independent random variables
That is, for any fixed θ = (θ i , θ −i ) and θ −i , the variablesψ s θ,θ −i , s = 1, 2, . . ., form a sequence of iid draws from P i (· | θ i ). Given any r = (r t ) T t=1 , we generate the path (θ t i , x t −i ) T t=1 of player i's types (which equal his messages) and the vectors x t −i ∈ Θ −i recursively as follows:
(θ 1 i , x 1 −i ) is a constant given by the degenerate initial distribution λ i and r 1 . For 1 < t ≤ T , suppose (θ τ i , x τ −i )
t−1 τ =1 have been generated. Then let
. That is, r t determines x t −i , and then θ t i is found by sampling the first unsampled element in the sequence (ψ s
) s∈N .
26
Denote by E θ,θ −i ∈ B the event where, for all k ∈ N, the empirical distribution of the first k variables in the sequence (ψ s (θ,θ −i ) ) s∈N is within b k of the true distribution
for all θ, θ −i , and henceP(E) ≥ 1 − ε n . To complete the proof, note that conditional on E, player i passes the test
) for all t = 1, . . . , T . Indeed, by construction, for all t and all (θ,
Having established condition (1) of Lemma 5.1, we now turn to condition (2). By Lemma B.2, it suffices to show that the test (b k ) satisfies the following:
(2 ) For all η > 0, there existsT < ∞ such that in every CRM (f, (b k ), T ) with T >T , for all ρ and all λ,
where P T is the empirical matrix defined for each (x 1 , . . . , x T ) ∈ Θ T by
It is useful to define the sequence (c k ) from (b k ) by
26 To see that this generates the right process, fix a path (θ ) for all t, in which case its probability under (λi, Pi) is simply
On the other hand, our auxiliary construction assigns it probability
where to write the joint probability as a product. But by construction,
(and similarly for elements not written out) so both methods assign the path the same probability.
Note that (c k ) is a relaxed version of the test (b k ): clearly c k ≥ b k for all k, whereas c k → 0 follows by the following observation, stated as a lemma for future reference:
Takek such that d k < η for all k ≥ αk. Let j k be a maximizer for k. Then for any k ≥k we have
where the second inequality follows by noting that if
, for all ρ and λ,
That is, the sequence (x 1 , . . . , x T ), which the mechanism uses to determine actions, has every player i passing the relaxed test (c k ) at the end of the CRM with high probability irrespective of the players' strategies. , . . . , x T i by simulating i's true type process. Thus continuation play is isomorphic to a situation where i reports the rest of his types truthfully. Hence Lemma B.3 implies that, conditional on failing (b k ) at (x 1 , . . . , x s ), i passes (b k ) at (x s+1 , . . . , x T ) with probability at least 1 − ε n . In this event, for any (θ, θ −i ), we can decompose the empirical frequency of x t i 's as
where
. . , x T ) and Φ 2 is the corresponding empirical frequency, • Φ 3 is the empirical frequency of i's reports in period τ ,
We conclude that conditional on failing (b k ) at some (x 1 , . . . , x τ ), i passes (c k ) at (x 1 , . . . , x T ) with probability at least 1− ε n . On the other hand, if i never fails (b k ),
By Lemma B.5 the set Ξ T has the desired probability given any ρ and λ. Hence for condition (2 ) it suffices to establish that for every sequence of sequences (x 1 , . . . , x T ) ∈ Ξ T , T ∈ N, we have P T → P , and that the rate of convergence is uniform across all such sequences. As the first step in this accounting exercise, the next lemma shows that all transitions that have positive probability under the true process appear infinitely often in (x 1 , . . . , x T ) ∈ Ξ T as T → ∞.
Lemma B.6. There exists a map κ : N → R with κ(T ) → ∞ such that for all
. . , n . We ignore integer constraints throughout the proof to simplify notation.
Proof of Claim. Since (x 1 , . . . , x T ) ∈ Ξ T , we have
proving the Claim.
We claim that for all θ 1 ∈ supp P (· | θ 0 ), we have τ T (θ 0 , θ 1 ) ≥ k 1 n , where k 1 n is determined from k 1 0 by setting l = 1 in the recursion (B.1) k where θ 1 i ∈ supp P i (· | θ 0 i ) for all i. Hence the bound follows by applying Claim B.2 n times.
We note then that for every θ 1 ∈ supp P (· | θ 0 ), there exists θ ∈ Θ such that
Thus applying Claim B.2 again n times allows us to deduce that τ T (θ 1 , θ 2 ) ≥ k 2 n for all θ 2 ∈ supp P (· | θ 1 ), where k 2 n is determined from k 2 0 by setting l = 2 in (B.1). We observe that k 2 n < k 1 n . Continuing in this manner defines a decreasing sequence (k 1 n , k 2 n , . . . , k l n , . . . ) such that for each l, k l n is given by the n-step recursion (B.1) with initial condition
By construction, for any sequence
Since P is irreducible, there exists L < ∞ such that every pair (θ , θ ) ∈ Θ 2 with P (θ | θ ) > 0 is along some such sequence starting from any θ 0 . For this L we have
n is independent of (x 1 , . . . , x T ) by inspection of (B.1) and (B.2).
It remains to argue that k L n → ∞ as T → ∞. But since L is finite, this follows by noting that k 1 0 grows linearly in T by (B.2), and for each l = 1, . . . , L, k l n → ∞ as k l 0 → ∞ by (B.1). We may thus put κ(T ) = k L n to conclude the proof. Now fix a sequence (x 1 , . . . , x T ) ∈ Ξ T for each T ∈ N. Let P T denote the empirical matrix for (x 1 , . . . , x T ) as defined in condition (2 ). Consider P T (θ | θ) for some (θ, θ ) ∈ Θ 2 such that P (θ | θ) > 0. Write
where θ {i+1,...,n} = (θ i+1 , . . . , θ n ) and we have defined
where (y, θ {i+1,...,n} ) = (y 1 , . . . , y i−1 , θ i+1 , . . . , θ n ) and the weight w(y) is given by
.
Since (x 1 , . . . , x T ) ∈ Ξ T , we have for all y ∈ i−1 j=1 Θ j ,
and thus (y, θ {i+1,. ..,n} )), and note that
where the last inequality is by Lemma B.6 since P (θ | θ) > 0 by assumption. Thus
Since K(T ) ≥ κ(T ) and κ(T ) → ∞, we have K(T ) → ∞. Lemma B.4 then implies
Therefore,
is independent of the sequences (x 1 , . . . , x T ), T ∈ N, by Lemma B.6, and hence convergence is uniform as desired.
To finish the proof, we observe that
This completes the proof of condition (2 ) and that of Lemma 5.1.
B.3. Proof of Theorem 5.1. Fix ε > 0 once and for all. We first find the cutoff discount factorδ < 1 for every T < ∞. To this end, for T < ∞ and δ ∈ [0, 1], consider the problem
The objective function is continuous in (δ, u) on [0, 1]×[0, 1] nT and d 1,T = 0. Thus the Maximum Theorem implies that for all T < ∞, there existsδ(T ) < 1 such that for all δ >δ(T ),
. By Lemma 5.1 there exists a test (b k ) and a timeT < ∞ such that for all i, ρ −i , λ, and T >T , we have both θ t i = x t i for all t and π T − π < η with P ρ * i ,ρ −i -probability at least 1 − η. Therefore, for all v, i, ρ −i , λ, T >T , and
Thus player i can truthfully secure v i − ε as desired.
B.4. Proof of Corollary 5.1. We need two preliminary results. Let v ∈ R n . Take p ∈ R n + \ {0} such that for all w ∈ V , p · w ≤ p · v. Let κ > 0 and define the set
Lemma B.7. Assume that p 0 and i p i = 1. Then, for all w ∈ Tr(κ, v),
Proof. Consider the problem max{ w − v | w ∈ Tr(κ, v)}. This is a problem of maximizing a convex function on a convex and compact set. Corollary 32.3.2 in Rockafellar (1970) implies that the maximum is attained at extreme points of Tr(κ, v). Now, observe that Tr(κ, v) is a polytope that can be written as the intersection of n + 1 linear inequalities
where β 0 = p, α 0 = p · v, and for i = 1, . . . , n, β i ∈ R n is minus the unit vector having 1 in the i-th component and α i = κ − v i . The polytope Tr(κ, v) has n + 1 extreme points. To see this, note first that if one of the n + 1 linear inequalities defining Tr(κ, v) does not bind at some extreme point w, then all the other n linear inequalities must bind for otherwise we could obtain w as a convex combination of vectors in Tr(κ, v). It then follows that the set of extreme points of Tr(κ, v) equals {w 0 , w 1 , . . . , w n } where w 0 = v − κ(1, . . . , 1) T and for i = 1, . . . , n w i i = v i + κ p i j =i p j and w i j = v j − κ for i = j. We deduce that
which proves the lemma.
Lemma B.8. Fixε > 0. There existsT such that for all T ≥T there existsδ < 1 such that for all δ >δ the following hold:
The corollary now follows by observing that
Appendix C. A Proof for Section 6
Proof of Lemma 6.1. The first part is immediate, given the construction of the block CRM (
To see the second part, fix a player i and the initial state
for some r ∈ {1, . . . , d i }, where we write C i nd i +r = C i r . Observe that, without loss, we can assume that the initial state is such that θ i ∈ C i 1 . From Theorem 1.8.5 in Norris (1997) , there exists N = N (θ i ) ∈ N such that for all n ≥ N and all
Now, note that for any δ and any L ≥ (N + 1)d i + 1,
To bound the second term, takeL = max{nd i | nd i ≤ L} (≥ N d i + 1) and note that
and thus
if δ is big enough (uniformly in L). Let δ(i) ∈]0, 1[ be such that the last inequality holds for all δ ≥ δ(i). Now, let δ θ i be such that for all δ ≥ δ θ i , L(δ) ≥ (N (θ i ) + 1)d i + 1 and
Defining δ i,θ i = max{δ θ i , δ(i)}, it then follows that for all δ ≥ δ i,θ i ,
Finally, taking δ 1 = max{δ 0 , max{δ i,θ i | i = 1, . . . , n, θ i ∈ Θ i }} gives the result.
Appendix D. Formal Description of Strategies and Beliefs
In this appendix we present a formal description of the equilibrium strategies and beliefs in terms of an automaton.
It will be useful to introduce some notation to describe how actions are selected in each block CRM (φ i , (b k ), T ) ∞ . For an arbitrary sequence y = (y 1 , . . . , y t ), let y ≥n be the sequence (y n , . . . , y t ). LetT (t) = max{nT + 1 | n ≥ 0, nT + 1 ≤ t}. Given (m 1 , ω 1 , . . . , m t , ω t ), the block CRM selects the action a t = φ i (χ t−T (t)+1 (m 1 , ω 1 , . . . , m t , ω t ) ≥T (t) , ωT (t) ) ∈ A, where χ was defined in Remark 5.1. Let H(0) ⊂ H denote the set of feasible public histories in the block CRM (φ 0 , (b k ), T ) ∞ , the restriction being the requirement that actions be the ones the mechanisms would select. For i = 1, . . . , n, let H(i) ⊂ H denote the set of feasible public histories in the punishment mechanism (L, (φ i , (b k ), T ) ∞ ). The histories in H(i) consist of stick-subphase histories (periods t = 1, . . . , L) and carrot-subphase histories (periods t ≥ L + 1). For the stick-subphase histories, the restriction is that the action played by each player j = i coincide with a i j for t = 1, . . . , L. Denote by H(i, s) the set of all such histories. Feasible carrot-subphase histories are such that their first L periods coincide with an element of H(i, s), and for t > L the actions are the ones the mechanism would select. Denote by H(i, c) the set of all such histories. By definition, H(i) = H(i, s) ∪ H(i, c). Note that the null history ∅ is an element of each of the sets H(0), . . . , H(n).
Take h ∈ H(i), for some i = 0, 1, . . . , n, and (m, ω, a) ∈ Θ × [0, 1] × A such that (h, (m, ω, a)) / ∈ H(i). Then, by construction, there exists some j whose action a j does not match the action the corresponding mechanism would have selected given the history.
Our construction of the automaton distinguishes between two different stages r ∈ {0, 1} within each period t ≥ 1. The idea is that r = 0 corresponds to the reporting stage (i.e., t.2), and r = 1 to the action stage (i.e., t.4). Thus, the index used to describe the evolution of the automaton is the pair (t, r) endowed with the lexicographic order (t, 0) < (t, 1) < (t + 1, 0).
Let S = H(0) ∪ H(1) ∪ · · · ∪ H(n), and define
The state space of the automaton is the product {0, 1, . . . , n} × S × B × B, and we write (ι, s,B, B) for a generic element. The first component ι indicates the mechanism players are mimicking, while s indicates the current history in the mechanism. The third componentB indicates the (public) beliefs the players entertained about the private histories of types when the mechanism ι was triggered. The fourth component B indicates the players' current beliefs about the whole history of private types. For any s ∈ H t , let T(s) = t. Before describing the evolution of the automaton, we choose equilibria for the mechanisms as follows: Let (ρ 0,λ , µ 0,λ ) be a PBE assesment for (φ 0 , (b k ), T ) ∞ given initial beliefs λ. For all i = 1, . . . , n, all beliefs B ∈ B such that B ∈ n i=1 ∆(Θ t i ), and all punishment mechanisms (L, (φ i , (b k ), T ) ∞ ), take a PBE assessment (ρ i,B , µ i,B ) such that the strategy ρ i,B depends on B only through the marginal distribution of the period-t profile θ t . For completeness, we extend the belief system µ i,B so that, for each k ≥ 0, and each public historyh ∈ H(i) of the form (m t , ω t , a t , . . . , m t+k , ω t+k , a t+k ) or This extended belief system is computed using Bayes rule given the prior B ∈ n i=1 ∆(Θ t i ) and is assumed to satisfy the requirements imposed on PBE beliefs. The automaton evolves as follows: Let ι 1,0 = 0, s 1,0 = ∅,B 1,0 = B 1,0 = λ. For any t ≥ 1, define (ι t,1 , s t,1 ,B t,1 , B t,1 ) as follows. Let ι t,1 = ι t,0 , s t,1 = (s t,0 , (m t , ω t )),B t,1 =B t,0 and B t,1 (θ 1 , . . . , θ t ) = µ ι t,1 ,B t,1 (θ 1 , . . . , θ t ) | s t,1 .
For t ≥ 2, define (ι t,0 , s t,0 ,B t,0 , B t,0 ) as follows. Let B t,0 (θ 1 , . . . , θ t ) = µ ι t−1,1 ,B t−1,1 (θ 1 , . . . , θ t ) | s t−1,1 .
If (s t−1,1 , a t−1 ) ∈ H(ι t−1,1 ), then ι t,0 = ι t−1,1 , s t,0 = (s t−1,1 , a t−1 ),B t,0 =B t−1,1 . If (s t−1,1 , a t−1 ) / ∈ H(ι t−1,1 ), then take any j whose action a t−1 j differed from what the mechanism mandated and define ι t,0 = j,B t,0 = B t,0 and s t,0 = ∅.
The assessment (σ, µ) is constructed as follows. Fix a player i, a private history h t i = (θ 1 i , . . . , θ t i ) ∈ Θ t i and a public history h t ∈ H t . If h t ∈ (Θ × [0, 1] × A) t−1 , let Note that unless a deviation causes ι to change, play mimics some fixed PBE (ρ i,B , µ i,B ), i = 0, 1, . . . , n, B ∈ B. Thus to show that the strategies are sequentially rational, it suffices to show that any one-stage deviations that triggers a change in ι is unprofitable. By inspection of the automaton, such deviations consist of one-stage deviations in actions at the following three classes of states:
(1) ι t,1 = 0; (2) ι t,1 = i = 0, T (s t,1 ) ≤ L − 1; (3) ι t,1 = i = 0, T (s t,1 ) ≥ L.
These are informally described in Section 6.2 as cooperative-phase, stick-subphase, and carrot-subphase histories. Sequential rationality follows by the analysis there.
Appendix E. A Proof for Section 7
Proof of Proposition 7.1. We prove first that V ∩R n + ⊂ W ∩R n + . More specifically, we show that for any v ∈ V ∩ R n ++ , there exists α ∈ [0, 1] and w ∈ P(V ) such that v = αw. Since 0 ∈ V c , this implies v ∈ W ∩ R n + . Define
We prove at the end of this proof that
